Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...) it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance :76–100, 1985; Stich, Philosophical Topics 12:39–62, 1981; Stich, The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well-placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition. (shrink)

Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...) it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance :76–100, 1985; Stich, Philosophical Topics 12:39–62, 1981; Stich, The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well-placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce an approach for understanding social cognition that we call the normative approach to social cognition. Such an approach, which results from a systematization of previous arguments and ideas from authors such as Ryle, Dewey, or Wittgenstein, is an alternative to the classic model and the direct social perception model. In section 2, we evaluate the virtues and flaws of these two models. In section 3, we introduce the normative approach, according to (...) which human, socio-cognitive competences rely on a myriad of social norms and routines that mediate our social interactions in such a way that we can make sense of each other without taking into consideration their mental states. In sections 4 and 5, we find some common premises shared by the two prior models and offer some arguments against them. In section 6, we advance some possible arguments against our approach and offer some responses against them. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce an approach for understanding social cognition that we call the normative approach to social cognition. Such an approach, which results from a systematization of previous arguments and ideas from authors such as Ryle, Dewey, or Wittgenstein, is an alternative to the classic model and the direct social perception model. In section 2, we evaluate the virtues and flaws of these two models. In section 3, we introduce the normative approach, according to (...) which human, socio-cognitive competences rely on a myriad of social norms and routines that mediate our social interactions in such a way that we can make sense of each other without taking into consideration their mental states. In sections 4 and 5, we find some common premises shared by the two prior models and offer some arguments against them. In section 6, we advance some possible arguments against our approach and offer some responses against them. (shrink)

This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this question, we need to provide an account of what motivates (...) us to abide by our commitments. We first discuss two conceptions of the nature of the commitments present in joint action and of the norms that govern them. We contend that while normative considerations may have some motivational force, there are reasons to doubt that they, by themselves, could provide a sufficient motivational basis to fully explain why agents abide by their commitments and thus why their commitments are credible. In the next two sections, we discuss two proposals regarding further sources of motivation, reputation management and social emotions. We argue that while reputation management and social emotions certainly play a role in motivating us to act as committed, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to think that neither captures the most basic motivational force at work in sustaining commitments. We propose instead that the need to belong, i.e., the need to affiliate with others and form long-lasting bonds with them, is what primarily motivates us to interact and engage with those around us and act so as to preserve and reinforce the bonds we have forged with them. We argue that the need to belong is a more basic proximate motivation for conforming to commitments, in the sense both that affiliative behaviors are evidenced much earlier in human development than either reputation management or social emotions and that the need to belong is at least part of an explanation of why we care for our reputation and why we care about others’ assessments of our behavior. (shrink)

This paper assesses two different approaches to inner speech that can be found in the literature. One of them regards inner speech as a vehicle of conscious thought. The other holds that inner speech is better characterised as an activity derived from social uses of its outer counterpart. In this paper I focus on the explanatory power of each approach to account for the control of attention and behaviour in the context of executive tasks. I will argue that the vehicle (...) view cannot capture some central cases of inner speech in executive tasks because they cannot be described as cases of bringing thought into consciousness. Then I will offer a revised version of the activity view and I will apply it to some examples so as to show that it is better posited to account for them. I end by considering two objections to the activity view and a possible way to address them. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a renewed concern about the dangers of eliminative materialism, as well as several attempts to discuss alternative positions such as new versions of interpretivism or fictionalism. Although expressivism has also emerged as a possibility, the problems with hybrid versions of expressivism in applying it to attitude ascriptions have led to a strong rejection of the proposal. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it argues that there are still theoretical tools available to defend (...) an expressivist analysis of mental state ascriptions. Second, the article contends that three of the most influential arguments in expressivism in meta-ethics and meta-epistemology are applicable to the case of mental state ascriptions. (shrink)

In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604.; Mölder 2010. Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Sanchez-Curry 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905–930.; Mölder 2021. “Interpretivism Without Judgement-Dependence.” Philosophia 49 (2): 611–615.; Slors 2015. "Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions." Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10 (2): 18–27.]. Part of the virtue of (...) interpretivism lies in its ability to provide an answer to elminativist arguments without falling into the assumptions and problems of intentional realism. However, some recent developments in semantic expressivism applied to normative expressions could help to build an alternative theory to interpretivism that would enjoy the same virtues. The aim of this paper is to present and defend an expressivist approach to the status of folk psychological ascriptions. According to this view, mental states ascriptions are evaluative and non-descriptive statement that express or reflect certain normative standards or values of the attributor. After presenting the view and contrasting it with interpretivist positions, with which expressivism shares important motivations and claims, I present two arguments to favor the expressivist analysis. In line with the first argument, expressivism can account for fundamental aspects of disagreements regarding mental attributions while the second highlights the capacity of the view to explain the widespread justificatory and exculpatory uses of mental states ascriptions. (shrink)

Mindreading capacity has been widely understood as the human ability to gain knowledge about the inner processes and states of others that bring about the behavior of these agents. This paper argues against this epistemic view of mindreading on the basis of different empirical studies in linguistics and social and developmental psychology: we are systematically biased in attributing mental states, and many everyday uses of mental ascription sentences do not reflect an epistemic function in our social interactions. We introduce an (...) alternative view of mental ascriptions, the social cover view, which is consistent with the evidence. The social cover view holds that the main function of mental ascriptions is to cover the social status and reputation of an agent rather than to gain knowledge about her inner processes and states. Finally, we discuss two possible objections to our proposal. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a version of the so-called conversational hypothesis of the ontogenetic connection between language and mindreading (Harris 1996, 2005; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; Hughes et al. 2006). After arguing against a particular way of understanding the hypothesis (the communicative view), I will start from the justificatory view in philosophy of social cognition (Andrews 2012; Hutto 2004; Zawidzki 2013) to make the case for the idea that the primary function of belief and desire (...) attributions is to justify and normalize deviant patterns of behaviour. Following this framework, I elaborate upon the idea that development of folk psychological skills requires the subjects to engage in conversationally mediated joint and cooperative activities in order to acquire the conceptual capacity of ascribing propositional attitudes. After presenting the general version of the hypothesis, I present several testable sub-hypotheses and some psychological studies that give empirical plausibility to the hypothesis. (shrink)

The vast expansion of research in human-robot interactions (HRI) these last decades has been accompanied by the design of increasingly skilled robots for engaging in joint actions with humans. However, these advances have encountered significant challenges to ensure fluent interactions and sustain human motivation through the different steps of joint action. After exploring current literature on joint action in HRI, leading to a more precise definition of these challenges, the present article proposes some perspectives borrowed from psychology and philosophy showing (...) the key role of communication in human interactions. From mutual recognition between individuals to the expression of commitment and social expectations, we argue that communicative cues can facilitate coordination, prediction, and motivation in the context of joint action. The description of several notions thus suggests that some communicative capacities can be implemented in the context of joint action for HRI, leading to an integrated perspective of robotic communication. (shrink)

Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily (...) on it. We characterize our view in terms of four issues that, according to Proust, distinguish the previous approaches, namely, whether metacognitive mechanisms are the same as those employed to access other minds, whether metacognitive control requires conceptual representation, whether metacognition is propositional, and whether metacognitive access is linked to mental action. After describing some of the mechanisms for self-mindshaping, we show how this view regards metacognition as grounded on social interaction mechanisms, conceptually driven, possibly, but not necessarily, propositional, and engaged in the practical regulation of mental states. Finally, we examine the prospects for the primacy of self-mindshaping as the primary metacognitive function. We argue that self-attributive processes typically subserve the practical goals emphasized by the mindshaping view, and that the evaluative role played by procedural metacognition can be grounded on social cues rather than on experiential feelings. Even if this is not enough to claim the primacy of self-mindshaping, it still appears as a third kind of metacognition, not reducible to the other two. (shrink)

A widespread view in philosophy claims that inner speech is closely tied to human metacognitive capacities. This so-called format view of inner speech considers that talking to oneself allows humans to gain access to their own mental states by forming metarepresentation states through the rehearsal of inner utterances (section 2). The aim of this paper is to present two problems to this view (section 3) and offer an alternative view to the connection between inner speech and metacognition (section 4). According (...) to this alternative, inner speech (meta)cognitive functions derivate from the set of commitments we mobilize in our communicative exchanges. After presenting this commitment-based approach, I address two possible objections (section 5). (shrink)

To advance the task of designing robots capable of performing collective tasks with humans, studies in human–robot interaction often turn to psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience for inspiration. In the same vein, this chapter explores how the notion of recognition and commitment can help confront some of the current problems in addressing robot-human interaction in joint tasks. First, we argue that joint actions require mutual recognition, which cannot be established without the attribution and maintenance of commitments. Second, we argue (...) that commitments require affective states such as social motivations or shared emotions. Finally, we conclude by assessing three possible proposals for how social robotics could implement an architecture of commitments by taking such an affective components into consideration. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.

This paper assesses two different approaches to inner speech that can be found in the literature. One of them regards inner speech as a vehicle of conscious thought. The other holds that inner speech is better characterised as an activity derived from social uses of its outer counterpart. In this paper I focus on the explanatory power of each approach to account for the control of attention and behaviour in the context of executive tasks. I will argue that the vehicle (...) view cannot capture some central cases of inner speech in executive tasks because they cannot be described as cases of bringing thought into consciousness. Then I will offer a revised version of the activity view and I will apply it to some examples so as to show that it is better posited to account for them. I end by considering two objections to the activity view and a possible way to address them. (shrink)

In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604.; Mölder 2010. Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Sanchez-Curry 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905– 930.; Mölder 2021. “Interpretivism Without Judgement- Dependence.” Philosophia 49 (2): 611–615.; Slors 2015. "Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions." Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10 (2): 18–27.]. Part of the (...) virtue of interpretivism lies in its ability to provide an answer to elminativist arguments without falling into the assumptions and problems of intentional realism. However, some recent developments in semantic expressivism applied to normative expressions could help to build an alternative theory to interpretivism that would enjoy the same virtues. The aim of this paper is to present and defend an expressivist approach to the status of folk psychological ascriptions. According to this view, mental states ascriptions are evaluative and non-descriptive statement that express or reflect certain normative standards or values of the attributor. After presenting the view and contrasting it with interpretivist positions, with which expressivism shares important motivations and claims, I present two arguments to favor the expressivist analysis. In line with the first argument, expressivism can account for fundamental aspects of disagreements regarding mental attributions while the second highlights the capacity of the view to explain the widespread justificatory and exculpatory uses of mental states ascriptions. (shrink)

Social robotics attempts to build robots able to interact with humans and other robots. Philosophical and scientific research in social cognition can provide social robotics research with models of social cognition to implement those models in mechanic agents. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, I present and defend a framework in social cognition known as mindshaping. According to it, human beings are biologically predisposed to learn and teach cultural and rational norms and complex cultural patterns of behavior that (...) enhance social cognition. Secondly, I will highlight how this framework can open new research perspectives in the area of social robotics. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buonomo (2021) have argued that we can evaluate our metaphysical proposals on fundamental categories in terms of their capacity for reconciling the scientific and the manifest image of the world. This criterion of fundamentality would allow us to settle the question of which categories among those proposed in the debate—e.g., substance, structure or facts—have a better explanatory value. The aim of this essay is to argue against a central assumption of (...) the criterion: semantic descriptivism. Specifically, I aim at showing that the criterion rests on the idea that the manifest picture is mostly a description of the world, and thus, it commits us with certain realism. Instead, I argue that at least some of the vocabulary we use to construct our manifest picture of the world, mental vocabulary, is evaluative rather than descriptive and thus creates problems in reconcile the manifest picture with scientific psychology and neurosciences. I conclude with some remarks on alternatives that could provide a way out of the fundamentality criterion. (shrink)

The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that (...) belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face. (shrink)

An important tradition in philosophy holds that in order to successfully perform a joint action, the participants must be capable of establishing commitments on joint goals and shared plans. This suggests that social robotics should endow robots with similar competences for commitment management in order to achieve the objective of performing joint tasks in human-robot interactions. In this paper, we examine two philosophical approaches to commitments. These approaches, we argue, emphasize different behavioral and cognitive aspects of commitments that give roboticists (...) a way to give meaning to monitoring and pro-active signaling in joint action with human partners. To show that, we present an example of use-case with guiding robots and we sketch a framework that can be used to explore the type of capacities and behaviors that a robot may need to manage commitments. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es exponer y analizar críticamente el libro de Tadeusz Zawidzki Mindshaping. Este libro presenta una visión alternativa a la visión estándar de la cognición social de acuerdo con la cual el eje central de nuestras capacidades socio-cognitivas es el mecanismo psicológico conocido como lectura de mentes. Por el contrario, el libro defiende que ciertos mecanismos de mindshaping dan forma a nuestra mente de manera que nuestra conducta es más cooperativa y fácilmente interpretable para los demás. (...) De este modo, algunos de los rasgos sociales característicos del ser humano dependieron evolutivamente de los mecanismos de mindshaping. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a philosophically inspired list of minimal requirements for social agency that may serve as a guideline for social robotics. Such a list does not aim at detailing the cognitive processes behind sociality but at providing an implementation-free characterization of the capacities and skills associated with sociality. We employ the notion of intentional stance as a methodological ground to study intentional agency and extend it into a social stance that takes into account social (...) features of behavior. We discuss the basic requirements of sociality and different ways to understand them, and suggest some potential benefits of understanding them in an instrumentalist way in the context of social robotics. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss how commitments may contribute (...) to make acting jointly emotionally rewarding, both by improving coordination and by inducing or reinforcing the circumstances under which shared emotions emerge among co-agents. (shrink)

This paper aims at presenting a horizontal approach to the design of communication for joint action in human-robot interaction. According to this approach, social robotics must focus on different parameters of the whole joint action including context, the embedded situation and human psychological profile during the design and test process. Such an approach aims at complementing the standard building-block model that represents the state-of-the-art in robotic communication. Moreover, we provide some general ideas of how the model can facilitate the use (...) of available communicative strategies for creating more efficient culturally sustainable robots in contexts of joint action. (shrink)

Uno de los principales problemas de la filosofía de la psicopatología contemporánea consiste en definir qué tipo de estados mentales son aquellos que denominamos delirantes. A esto se le ha denominado el “problema tipológico de los delirios”. El principal objetivo de este artículo es examinar las principales alternativas filosóficas contemporáneas a este problema: el doxasticismo—de acuerdo con el cuál los delirios deben ser caracterizados como creencias—y al anti-doxasticismo—el cuál niega el estatuto doxásticos de los delirios y ofrece una caracterización alternativa. (...) Para examinar el debate, el artículo presentará las principales características de ambas posiciones y sus fundamentos. Después, examinaremos los principales argumentos esgrimidos contra el doxasticismo y las respuestas y contraargumentos por parte de las alternativas doxásticas. Finalmente, expondremos algunas cuestiones conceptuales y desafíos abiertos relacionados con el debate y que, a nuestro juicio, deberían de marcar la hoja de ruta de los filósofos de la mente interesados en los delirios en los próximos años. (shrink)

Uno de los principales problemas de la filosofía de la psicopatología contemporánea consiste en definir qué tipo de estados mentales son aquellos que denominamos delirantes. A esto se le ha denominado el “problema tipológico de los delirios”. El principal objetivo de este artículo es examinar las principales alternativas filosóficas contemporáneas a este problema: el doxasticismo—de acuerdo con el cuál los deli-rios deben ser caracterizados como creencias—y al anti-doxasticismo—el cuál niega el estatuto doxásticos de los delirios y ofrece una caracterización alternativa. (...) Para examinar el debate, el artículo presentará las principales características de ambas posiciones y sus fundamentos. Después, examinaremos los principales argumentos esgrimidos contra el doxasticismo y las respuestas y contraargumentos por parte de las alternativas doxásticas. Finalmente, expondremos algunas cuestiones conceptua-les y desafíos abiertos relacionados con el debate y que, a nuestro juicio, deberían de marcar la hoja de ruta de los filósofos de la mente interesados en los delirios en los próximos años. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La dificultad de elaborar políticas públicas capaces de integrar una estrategia de acción dirigida a la participación política y el ejercicio de una ciudadanía activa por parte de las mujeres obliga a recapacitar sobre modelos de actuación cuyo objetivo contemple al mismo tiempo la dimensión colectiva y la individual del empoderamiento político, como clave estratégica para el diseño de políticas de igualdad de género que pretendan tal finalidad. El presente trabajo ofrece una propuesta de medidas para las políticas de (...) igualdad que, combinadas unas con otras atendiendo a la situación actual del panorama político, responden a una estrategia de acción integral para el empoderamiento político de las mujeres.ABSTRACT: The difficulty of developing public policies capable of integrating an action strategy aimed at political participation and the exercise of active citizenship by women forced to rethink models of action aimed at the same time contemplating collective and individual dimension of political empowerment as a strategic key to the design of gender equality policies that seek this purpose. This work presents a proposal of measures for equality policies, combined with each other in response to the current situation of the Spanish panorama, reflect a comprehensive action strategy for the political empowerment of women.PALABRAS CLAVE: empoderamiento; políticas; ciudadanía; participación; igualdad. KEYWORDS: empowerment; policies; citizenship; participation; equality. (shrink)

El pasaje de la Elegía de Gray (PEG) en “On Denoting” es extremadamente obscuro y ha sido objeto de muy diversas interpretaciones. Aparentemente contiene una crítica devastadora contra la teoría de los conceptos denotativos que el propio Russell había postulado en The Principles of Mathematics (PM) (1903). En este artículo exponemos sucintamente dicha teoría semántica, examinamos detalladamente el pasaje en cuestión y exploramos algunas de las interpretaciones que pretenden desentrañar su sentido. Con ello mostramos, en primer lugar, que la crítica (...) se dirige directamente contra la teoría de PM; en segundo lugar, que no es posible hacer unos pocos cambios homogéneos para habilitar una lectura literal del pasaje; finalmente, que, si bien algunos de los argumentos que los intérpretes han aducido para abandonar la teoría de los conceptos denotativos son sólidos, no es obvio que todos ellos se encuentren en PEG. (shrink)

La vida y obra del polígrafo granadino Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb (m. 776/1374) sigue siendo fuente de importantes estudios y traducciones habida cuenta de que su prolija producción literaria está repleta de valiosos testimonios históricos y personales que sitúan a su autor como un personaje destacado en la transmisión del conocimiento en el Mediterráneo islámico. En la difusión de su obra y prestigio jugó un papel fundamental la copia manuscrita de su obra al-Iḥāṭa fī aḫbār Ġarnāṭa que Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb envió (...) en vida (768/1366), a través de su hijo ʿAlī, a la ḫānqāh de Saʿīd al-suʿadāʾ de El Cairo, regida por el tremeceno Ibn Abī Ḥaǧala (m. 776/1375). El conocimiento de esta copia ha llegado hasta nosotros a través de otro tremeceno, al-Maqqarī (m. 1041/1632) y su monumental obra, Nafḥ al-ṭīb, en honor al sabio granadino. Gracias a ella sabemos, entre otras cosas, que esta copia fue profusamente consultada y comentada en sus márgenes. Dos autores destacan por encima de los demás: el hijo del autor Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī (m. s. IX/XV), y el magrebí Ibn Marzūq (m. 781/1379). A través del estudio y la traducción de las notas manuscritas de este manuscrito cairota, este estudio pretende poner de relieve el valor de los marginalia como fuente documental, así como arrojar un poco más de luz sobre estas dos figuras, junto con al-Maqqarī, como piezas importantes en la transmisión y pervivencia de la obra de Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb en el Oriente islámico hasta al menos el siglo XI/XVII. (shrink)

ResumenEste artículo propone una idea de intervención e institución que se entrelace en lo social a través del concepto de contagio como elemento filosófico articulador. En primer lugar, se establece un marco teórico-filosófico para pensar la vida como una ontología social del contagio, que permita habitar un pensar relacional etológico que se abra a otros modos de existencia. Desde este marco, los hallazgos perfilan la relación intervención-institución desde la sensibilidad que evoca esta forma distinta de intervención en lo social, disponiendo (...) de otros modos las variaciones de la institución y sus procesos de instituir el campo social. Se concluye discutiendo la relación entre intervención y sus capacidades transformativas como componente metódico y epistemológico distinto que trae consigo un fuerte potencial político y ético. Al multiplicar los modos de ser y los procesos de subjetivación se abren prácticas humanas y más-que-humanas, instituyendo otros modos de hacer-y-pensar toda intervención del presente.Palabras clave: institución; intervención; contagio; formas de vida; cartografías. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo es someter a escrutinio la afirmación de Hintikka según la cual la verdadera lógica elemental no es la clásica sino la lógica IF y, en consecuencia, el marco en que ordinariamente son pensadas las relaciones entre lógica y matemáticas es por completo inadecuado. Pa..

The aim of this paper is to show the impact of Russell’s paradox in Frege’s mathemathical and philosophical system. First, it shows that the development of the Begriffsschrift was enough to give a structural definition of natural numbers, but not enough to accomplish Frege’s program. For this it w..

The objective of this work is to set out three semantic methods for the analysis of ordinary discourse. These methods arose historically as a solution to certain problems such as those presented by Russell in “On denoting” and which, according to him, all semantic theory should be able to.solve...

El coaching ejecutivo ha dado lugar a numerosos desarrollos de orientación básicamente prescriptiva. Una perspectiva crítica y con base empírica puede permitir ir más allá de la retórica del coaching e identificar las tensiones y las contradicciones de los procesos de coaching en un contexto organizacional, como entorno relacional y cultural. El objetivo de este trabajo es acercarnos críticamente al coaching ejecutivo individual en la práctica, estableciendo las diferencias entre lo preconizado por las teorías y los expertos del coaching y (...) lo que se hace en las empresas. Mediante 50 entrevistas en profundidad a coaches y coachees, identificamos cuatro grandes discursos sobre el coaching ejecutivo: a) herramienta de crecimiento personal; b) relación diádica; c) resolución de problemas en equipos de trabajo; y d) mecanismo de cambio organizacional. El análisis muestra las tensiones y las contradicciones ad intra y entre los discursos y, con ello, la importancia de considerar el contexto organizacional. (shrink)

This review presents a state of the art in artificial intelligence applied to urban planning and particularly to land-use predictions. In this review, different articles after the year 2016 are analyzed mostly focusing on those that are not mentioned in earlier publications. Most of the articles analyzed used a combination of Markov chains and cellular automata to predict the growth of urban areas and metropolitan regions. We noticed that most of these simulations were applied in various areas of China. An (...) analysis of the publication of articles in the area over time is included. (shrink)

Knowledge of diverse sexual motivations can have profound implications for our comprehension of the causes, correlations, and consequences of sexual behavior. This study had two objectives: on the one hand, to determine the different motives why young Spanish university students have sex and their relationship with different sociodemographic and psychosexual variables and sexual behavior; on the other hand, to review and improve the psychometric properties of the Sexual Motivations Scale and validate it in Spanish. Participants were 805 university students of (...) both sexes, aged between 18 and 26 years, who completed a battery of online questionnaires. Significant associations were found between young people's sexual motives, especially the motives of coping, peer pressure, and enhancement, the sociodemographic variables, sexual behavior, and psychosexual variables. Also, a new structure of the Sexual Motivations Scale was proposed, with the elimination of the factor of Self-Affirmation. The discussion highlights the relevance of the results obtained due to their implications in the promotion of sexual health, in addition to achieving the first instrument validated in Spanish for the evaluation of sexual motivations. (shrink)

El docente de Música en secundaria asume un itinerario formativo que privilegia el desarrollo de capacidades técnico-musicales sobre lo didáctico-pedagógico. Este estudio analiza la percepción del profesorado en Galicia en lo que respecta en su capacitación para la creación musical, respecto al resto de competencias musicales, transversales y pedagógicas. Mediante un estudio exploratorio a través de cuestionario, se concluye que la creación es concebida como uno de los aspectos menos prioritarios, así como uno de los menos movilizados en la práctica. (...) Ello posibilita el diseño de nuevas líneas investigativas y formativas en el ámbito de la formación del profesorado. (shrink)

Logic and philosophy of logic have increasingly become areas of research and great interest in Latin America and Spain, where significant work has been done and continues to be done in both of these fields. The goal of this volume is to draw attention to this work through a collection of original and unpublished papers by specialists from Latin America and Spain. Some of the papers are of importance for set-theory and model theory. They cover topics such as the foundations (...) of paraconsistency, the use of paraconsistent logic as a basis for set-theory, and the methodological aspects in both the justification of new axioms in set theory and the formalization of pre-theoretic notions. Other papers are related to epistemic logic. They deal with the issues of abduction and the choice of the simplest hypothesis, the definition of group probability, and the nature of explanation and understanding in such logic. There are also papers on logical paradoxes, the semantics of names, and the nature of relations. Max A. Freund is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the University of Costa Rica and the National University of Costa Rica. He is co-author of the book Modal Logic its syntax and semantics, as well as the author of Judicial Logic, and of a forthcoming book The Logic of Sortals. Max Fernandez de Castro is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Mexico. He is the author of the book Quine y la Ontologíaa and co-author of the books Lógica Matemática I: lógica proposicional, intuicionista y modal, Lógica Matemática II: clásica, intuicionista y modal, Teoría de Conjuntos, Lógica y Temas Afines I. Marco Ruffino is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Campinas and the editor of Manuscrito, the Brazilian international journal for Analytic Philosophy. He has many publications, in important philosophical journals, in the philosophy of language, of logic, and of mathematics; in the history of analytic philosophy, and on Frege and Wittgenstein. (shrink)